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Abstract 
     The rapidly changing business circumstances of 21
st
 century go beyond the traditional 
competitive advantage theories such as Porter’s SCP model and Barney’s Resource Based View, 
which makes companies hard to sustain its competitive position over time. In this context, the thesis 
aims to examine how a company should achieve its long term growth in a dynamic business 
environment through an in-depth analysis of Johnson & Johnson (J&J) and its mechanism of 
continuous renewal of strategy and organizational capabilities.   
As examinations, four analyses are adopted: 1) Era analysis of J&J comparing with other 
players in the pharmaceutical industry to clarify J&J’s unique business activities, 2) Dynamic 
Capability Framework (DCF) analysis to unveil how J&J achieves its competitive advantage, and 
extract its core competence to see why it is possible, 3) Activity System analysis to investigate how 
core competence relates and enforces with each other, and 4) Relationship analysis of J&J’s strategy 
and core competence development to look into how the strategy influence on building core 
competence and vice versa. 
It is evidential that J&J has been successful in sustaining its competitive position by constantly 
launching valuable new products in its core healthcare business domain through a series of 
acquisitions of external venture firms as well as organic development. Such activities can be 
articulated by DCF perspective, namely an effective use of processes of opportunity sensing, idea 
 seizing and business reconfiguring. Moreover, the in-depth analysis of J&J’s long term growth path 
has revealed that the essence of performing DCF lies in the company’s intrinsic ability and culture 
determined by its core competence (or activity system). Specifically, core competence of customer 
and market knowledge ensures its open innovation to identify promising venture firms for 
acquisition, and decentralized management flexibly reconfigures the organization to utilize the 
acquired assets. At the center of J&J’s core competence, Our Credo acts as the adhesive to interrelate 
each core competence into J&J’s activity system. The set of core competence has been generated by 
each phase of J&J’s strategy, and the core competence in turn has enabled the company to develop 
next strategy.  
The result of J&J’s real-life case analysis implies how a company should achieve continuous 
growth, and implementing DCF, especially identifying changing customer and market needs in its 
sensing process should be effective in rapidly changing business environment. The result poses a 
further implication on why the company can implement DCF, and developing the mechanism to 
renew strategy and core competence based on the company’s core value with customer orientation 
should be of essence. 
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CHAPTER 1. CHAPTER1.  INTRODUCTION 
Section 1. OBJECTIVE 
     Now the time is in the era of VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and 
Ambiguity) and hypercompetition, which makes business circumstance rapidly changing, going 
beyond the traditional business theories such as Porter’s SCP model and Barney’s Resource 
Based View, and makes a company hard to achieve continuous competitive advantage. 
Therefore, they are now required to have foresight in advance toward a market and develop 
strategy and tactics to acquire a series of “temporary” competitive advantage for continuous 
growth. Along with the situation, Dynamic Capability Framework (DCF) which highlights 
companies’ strategic process and flexibility not only to adapt to the market but to lead it has 
been getting more paid attention. How in detail to implement DCF, however, remains to be 
uncovered, and there seems to be few previous researches to illustrate “real-life” DCF 
implementation cases.  
Given such a situation, this research tackles to investigate Johnson & Johnson’s (J&J) 
DCF, core competence which makes it possible, and how the competency has been developed 
through the mutual relationship between strategy and core competence. The implications 
extracted from this research must be beneficial in that they cast light on how a company should 
achieve continuous growth through a series of temporary competitive advantage, and why the 
company can implement DCF. 
Section 2. COMPOSITION OF THIS THESIS 
     This thesis consists of mainly three compartments: 1) Necessity of DCF, 2) J&J’s case 
analysis for DCF and core competence, and 3) Implications for essence of a company’s 
continuous growth (Figure 1). Compartment 1 explains necessity of DCF through reviewing 
how the business environment has changed into VUCA and hypercompetition world, where 
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famous traditional theories for competitive advantage cannot be well applied but DCF is 
becoming more important. Compartment 2 introduces J&J company profile and history, 
followed by its DCF, activity system analysis, and core competence which enables J&J to carry 
out DCF. Relationship between strategy and core competence on how it influenced each other 
for development is also analyzed. Compartment 3 describes implications based on analysis of 
J&J as to how should a company achieve continuous growth through a series of temporary 
competitive advantage, and why a company can implement DCF 
 
Figure1：Composition of Thesis 
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CHAPTER 2. THE ERA OF VUCA AND HYPERCOMPETITION 
Section 1. VUCA AND HYPERCOMPETITION WORLD 
No manager would deny the current business environment is rapidly changing into the world 
where a new business model emerges while the traditional one becomes obsolete. Consumers have 
more various needs and get empowered. Companies in any industry can handle with new entrants of 
whom they have never though as competitors. The situation is often represented as “VUCA”, 
abbreviation of Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity. Under VUCA world, “Good old 
days” of familiar competitive landscape no longer exist, but fierce competition among companies 
with different background take place instead.  
D’Aveni (1994) calls the world “hypercompetition”, where he defines the environment as 
characterized by intense and rapid competitive moves, in which competitors must move quickly to 
build advantage and erode the advantage of their rivals. He also states four arenas of 
hypercompetition, which are 1) cost-quality advantages, 2) timing and knowhow advantages, 3) 
strongholds from erecting entry barriers, and 4) deep pockets. Cost-quality advantages refer that 
competition forces a company to move to a position of ultimate value which is a high-quality 
product for a low cost as actions to create differentiation and avoid a price war ultimately prove 
futile. Timing and knowhow advantages suggest that first mover advantages exist but competitors 
imitate. The more they imitate, the better and faster they get, forcing the innovator to speed up its 
own cycle of innovation. Ultimately the cost of innovation exceeds the short-term gains that can be 
made from innovating. Strongholds from erecting entry barriers means few barriers to entry last long 
when severely challenged. Competitors build up their own resources and skills and are able to get 
over or around barriers that have been erected. Deep pockets suggest that companies can derive 
advantage through a larger resource base and superior concentration of focus to crush a smaller 
competitor through brute force. 
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Section 2. IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION, CAPITALIZATION AND DIGITALIZATION 
     Background surrounding VUCA and hypercompetition can be articulated when looking at the 
environment change since 1990, the end of cold war. Hirano (2017) stresses three key factors as 1) 
Global, 2) Capital, and 3) Digital. How each of the three has impacted on developing VUCA or 
Hypercompetition can be explained as below. 
 
Global 
     Hirano points out the globalization in post-cold war era is characterized by the radical 
expansion of economic market size from 600 million people in developed countries into 4 billion in 
developing ones, with connection of the two worlds where have quite different political systems, 
social criteria and national income level. Figure 2 shows the trajectory of population by income level 
since 1990, which clearly indicates emerging population of mid income level which implies an 
expansion of economic market. On the other hand, the world GDP share of developed countries such 
as US, EU and Japan decreased while the rest of world increased instead, which suggests that key 
players in economic market have been shifting to the emerging countries.  
Along with these trend shifts, multi-national companies are trying to enter the new frontier and 
seize the opportunity but there seems to often struggle with the distance between host country and 
the new markets which Ghemewat (2001) calls “CAGE”. In addition, the more emerging markets are 
born, the harder companies deal with their global business management to strike a balance between 
global integration and local responsiveness as Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) illustrate so called IR 
framework. All taken into account, globalization made economic market expand and diverse, which 
then influences a company’s business strategy and execution toward VUCA. 
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Figure 2: Population Share by Income Level (100%=7.35 Billion) 
 
                                   Source: Hirano (2017) 
                                          
Capital 
     Swelling capital economy is regarded by Hirano as one of the major trends since 1990s. He 
explains the background of its expansion attributes to an excessive investment supply due to macro 
level monetary easing led by the government and/or financial institutions. On the other hand, micro 
level economic activities such as innovation of finance technology (ex. securitization of equity and 
credit, and derivative products), rising of hedge funds and private equities, and increasing M&As are 
also mentioned as playing an important role in augmentation of capital economy. Figure 3 shows the 
world M&A deal value trends from 1980, and it is obvious that deal value increased significantly 
since after the end of the cold war. Hirano stresses that while the capital economy enhanced 
dynamism of company activities, negative aspects arose. Based on globally connected capital market, 
substantial speculative investment can easily be transferred, which caused a problem that some local 
financial crisis can give critical impact on the systemic global market and destabilizes the world 
economy. So-called “Lehman shock” is one good example which aggravated the worldwide 
economy because securitized bad debts had been spread into many parts of the world.  
     Inasmuch as the impact of globalization on VUCA, the growing capital market also acts as a 
huge risk factor for stability of business environment. M&A is surely an effective methodology for 
companies to enlarge their entity for obtaining scale merit, restructure resources or ownership for 
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strategic change, and secure a prompt access to a new business area or a local market. The great tool, 
however, comes with the great risk that deal objectives cannot be met for the reasons such as 
misunderstanding synergetic effects for sales up or cost down, lack of contemplating business aim 
and deal structuring in strategic level, and insufficient due diligence and valuation in execution level, 
and critical cultural difference and malfunction of governance and stakeholder management in PMI. 
Although M&A connotes those risks, companies have continued investing in big deals to acquire an 
advantage over competition, resulting in hypercompetition. Four arenas of hypercompetition which 
D’Aveni indicates would be owed, at least to some extent, to the increasing deal of M&As.  
 
Figure 3: World M&A Deal Value 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters, City Group 
 
Digital  
     Hirano explains starting digitization of economy originates from the end of cold war, when 
utilization of internet was released from military to public. One major characteristics of digital 
economy is platform, where startups can launch their business efficiently and can access to global 
customers from the start as “Born global”. Suppliers of platform, on the other hand, begot huge 
profit and grew to occupy top lists of world’s company market capitalization such as Apple, 
7 
Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook. It is also of note that digitization broke barriers of time 
and distance, and things were connected as IoT, which triggered emergence of a new business model. 
Through the impact of digitization, it cannot be overestimated that quality of life of people has been 
improved. 
     Although digital economy has bestowed a company a lot of benign effects, there are also some 
malignant aspects in VUCA and hypercompetition for companies. First, digitization often disrupts 
existing industry markets. It is through an innovative invention of totally new business model which 
is never created without digitization. For example, Amazon destroyed the traditional book store 
industry by creating an online book website. Uber disrupted existing TAXI industry by developing a 
sharing business model connecting drivers and passengers with smartphone App. Those cases appear 
good for customers, but for a company who have played for years in the stable environment and 
competed with familiar rivals digitization can surely be the big risk because it has enough power to 
make a current business model obsolete in an instance and invalidate a boundary of some industry, 
which an existing company has to compete with who have totally different business model and 
resources. Second, empowered consumers increase VUCA for a company. Under the digital 
economy, consumers can respond quickly for goods or services provided by a company and share it 
with others in a platform. The “real-life” user experience and response are instantly penetrating 
among other users in the platform, and they are cherished more than advertisement or any other 
commercial activities delivered by a company. Figure 4 shows the number of online active users 
compared with country populations, indicating that they are now organizing tremendously huge 
groups which are far larger than the big nations such as China, India and US, which endows 
consumers an ability, or agility, even to change politics. Likewise, the size of the platform should not 
be too small to give a tremendously huge impact on a company’s reputation and brand image. Thus, 
a company is required to carefully think about how consumers would react for their goods or 
services as well as take advantage of its impact to maximize business performance. 
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Figure 4: Active Users of Online Platforms vs Country Populations (Million) 
 
            Source: McKinsey Global Institute 
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CHAPTER 3. WHY DYNAMIC CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK IS  
          IMPORTANT? 
Section 1. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
     Creating competitive advantage has long been an area of interest for a company, and academia 
accordingly have pursued theories. Three most famous ones are Porter’s SCP model, Barney’s 
Resource Based View, and Prahalad and Hamel’s Core Competence.  
     Porter (1980) states that an industry structure defines intensity of competition, which develops 
a company’s conduct for competitive strategy, and the conduct results in performance. In other 
words, profitability of a company is determined by the structure of the industry. According to the 
theory, there are five forces in an industry to determine the profitability of a company: potential 
entrants, substitutes, suppliers, buyers and finally industry competitors. The theory also premises that 
all the five components are regarded as “competitors”. Thus, Porter explains that analysis of the 
structure is the fundamental underpinning for formulating competitive strategy and a key building 
block for most of the concepts, and once it is diagnosed, companies proceed to identify their 
strengths and weaknesses relative to the industry, which finally makes a company take a strategic 
position from three approaches: overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. It is mentioned in 
the theory that overall cost leadership can be achieved through aggressive construction of efficient 
scale facilities, vigorous pursuit of cost reductions from experience, tight cost and overhead control, 
avoidance of marginal customer accounts and cost minimization in areas like R&D, service, sales 
force, advertising and so forth. Porter says that once the low cost position is achieved, it can protect 
the company against all five forces since bargaining can only continue to erode profits until those of 
the next most efficient competitor are eliminated, and since the less efficient competitors will suffer 
first in the face of competitive pressures. Differentiation strategy suggests that it should create 
uniqueness in the industry. It refers to, for example, design, brand image, technology, customer 
service, and so forth. It is pointed out that although differentiation strategy does not mean to ignore 
costs, but they are not the primary strategic target. Porter stresses that differentiation is a viable 
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option to obtain above average returns in an industry since it creates a defensible position for coping 
with five forces, in a different way from cost leadership. Finally, focus strategy premises that a 
company can focus on some specific, narrow target more effectively than competitors who are 
competing more broadly. Through focusing on some particular target, the company can achieve 
either differentiation by satisfying a specific target better than competitors, or cost leadership by 
lowering cost for focused target than competitors, or both. The focus strategy accompanies trade-offs, 
however, between profitability and sales volume.  
     Barney’s Resource Based View (1991) in turn cast light not on external factors but on a 
company’s internal resources to achieve competitive advantage. It is said that the theory provided by 
Barney goes just the opposite direction to Porters’ SCP model. Barney points out that SCP model has 
placed little emphasis on the impact of idiosyncratic company attributes on a company’s competitive 
position, and implicitly adopted two simplifying assumptions; the environmental model of 
competitive advantage assumed that companies within an industry are identical in terms of 
strategically relevant resources they control and the strategies they pursue, and assumed that 
resource heterogeneity develop in an industry, that this heterogeneity will be very short lived 
because the resources that a company uses to implement their strategies are highly mobile. In this 
context, Barney stresses the difference between his Resource Based View and SCP model in that 
since Resource Based View stands on the link between a company’s internal characteristics and 
performance, it cannot build on the assumptions adopted in SCP model. Rather, Resource Based 
View premises other two assumptions. First, the model assumes a company within an industry may 
be heterogeneous with regards to the strategic resources they control. Second, the model assumes 
these resources may not be perfectly mobile across companies, which indicates heterogeneity can be 
sustained. Barney classified a company’s resources which can lead to competitive advantage into 
four perspectives: 1) Valuable Resources, 2) Rare Resources, 3) Imperfectly Imitable Resources and 
4) Organization. Those four resources are so called VRIO framework, and key questions for each of 
the four resources were presented as below; 
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1. The Question of Value: Does a resource enable a company to exploit an environmental 
opportunity, and/or neutralize an environment threat? 
2. The Question of Rarity: Is a resource currently controlled by only a small number of 
competing companies? 
3. The Questions of Imitability: Do companies without a resource face a cost disadvantage in 
obtaining or developing it? 
4. The Question of Organization: Is a company’s other policies and procedures organized to 
support the exploitation of its valuable, are, costly to imitate resources? 
 
Barney insists that all the four resources are required to achieve “sustained” competitive advantage, 
and inability of current and potential competitors to duplicate the resources makes a competitive 
advantage sustained. 
     Prahalad and Hamel (1990) developed the theory called Core Competence. The theory rests on 
the condition that major global companies have almost reached the level that both cost reduction and 
quality improvement cannot be enhanced any more, and those activities are getting less reliable to 
obtain competitive advantage but rather are minimum requirements to participate in competition. 
Instead, building core competence with less cost and in shorter time than competitors generates 
competitive advantage. Prahalad and Hamel also stress that acquiring and nurturing of core 
competence is a company’s organizational learning, and it needs to be given sufficient investments 
and protected. In addition, core competence is an adhesive to bond existing business portfolio and to 
create some new business opportunity, and they deny that attractiveness of a market analyzed 
through five forces defines the pattern to enter a new market or diversify a company’s business 
portfolio, but core competence does. For example, 3M consistently has invested in its core 
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competence in adhesive and coating technology and developed methodology to combine those 
competence. As a result, 3M diversified its business to many industries, but what made it diversified 
can account for its core competence, and the core competence rests behind its diversification. 
Prahalad and Hamel point out that three conditions should be considered to identify a company’s 
core competence. First, core competence must be something to bring an ability to enter broad and 
various markets. Second, it must contribute to the value of products to customers. Third, it must be 
what is difficult for competitors to imitate. Prahalad and Hamel admit that achieving competitive 
advantage can be possible temporary at least without developing core competence. In this sense, 
relying on outsourcing would be a shortcut for producing some great product, but it never 
contributes to nurture skill which is vital to acquire and sustain market leadership position, or which 
is accomplished through learning within an organization. Therefore, they suggest that a company 
should identify what kind of core competence to develop within its organization, and invest not on 
business units or their products, but on developing and retaining core competence. 
     As explained, the three major theories for competitive advantage were developed respectively 
during 1980-1990s, and they can be categorized into two different assumptions for acquiring 
competitive advantage; Porter’s SCP model seeks for competitive advantage deriving from an 
external factor such as the attractiveness of a market through analysis of the five forces surrounding 
a company, while Barney’s RBV and Prahalad and Hamel’s Core Competence count on an internal 
factor of a company’s distinctive resources. 
Section 2. SHORTER PERIOD OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE DUE TO CHANGING  
             ENVIRONMENT 
     As the business environment changed rapidly into VUCA and hypercompetition, it has 
become more challenging for companies to obtain and retain competitive advantage. Indeed, 
Wiggins (2005) researched whether the period of companies’ competitive advantage is becoming 
shorter over time, and proved that it was happening in broad range of industries. The research also 
found the occurrence of hypercompetition and large part of economy is characterized increasingly by 
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hypercompetitive behavior, and managers have reacted to this hypercompetition by seeking not for a 
single sustained competitive advantage, but for a series of short advantage which can lead to 
competitive advantage over time. Wiggins suspects that even industries with stable traditional 
technology bases are increasingly subject to the effects of changes in information technology which 
are ubiquitously deployed across all industries.  
     Findings by Wiggins gives an important issue to the traditional theories; those theories were 
developed based on a static market point of view. For example, Porter’s SCP model starts from an 
analysis of structure of an industry to select which industry should be entered and what position a 
company should take. It means that a company’s strategy is developed through a snapshot of the 
industry structure, and excludes from taking it into consideration that its environment could change 
at any point. In fact, Evan (2013) analyzed annual total shareholder returns (TSR) in various 
industries during 2001 to 2011 and found out that there were little differences among industries 
(Figure 5). Rather, the data shows striking differences in terms of range of returns by company in the 
same industry, which indicates that in the era of hypercompetition, the selection or switching of 
industries are not important but a company should concentrate on achieving the top of the industry 
they play. In addition, Ruefli (2003) proved that corporate factors better predict business 
performance than industry ones, indicating managers in a company can have an influence on 
business performance. Chen (2010) supports the evidence using a survey for 104 companies to 
investigate the behavioral aggressiveness of top management team that in the hypercompetition, a 
company which have the top management team with competitive mindset behave more aggressive 
actions, and its aggressiveness leads to a company’s performance than other companies who do not. 
Other related researches also provide similar results that companies’ competitive aggressiveness 
contributes to acquiring market share (Ferrier, 2001) or enhances ROA and ROS calling “the Red 
Queen Effect” (Derfus, 2008). 
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Figure 5: Annual Total Shareholder Returns by Industry (2001-2011) 
 
Source: Evan and Rangan (2013) 
 
Limitations can also be seen in Barney’s Resource Based View. Barney stands on the 
assumption that companies within an industry are heterogeneous in the resources they control, and 
these resources may not be perfectly mobile across companies. Based on these assumptions, the 
concept of VRIO was developed. But they can be vulnerable if there are some drastic or unpredicted 
changes in resource value, rarity, inimitability, and organizational system. D’Aveni (2010) 
challenges Porter’s SCP model and Barney’s RBV saying both five forces and RBV are rooted in a 
conception of the world that is essentially stable, and what if equilibrium is impossible or fleeting, or 
what if industry structure is too temporary to be called structure? Ikegami (2016) points out that 
there exist resources which act both as positive and negative effects, and the two sides can change 
depending on the business environment. Given the implication, RBV is actually required not just to 
look into internal resources but to outlook external circumstances. In fact, Barney (1991) himself 
admits that sustained competitive advantage does not mean that it will last forever, and unanticipated 
changes in the economic structure of an industry may make resources which have been valuable, rare, 
and inimitable obsolete and no longer source of competitive advantage. In this context, Core 
Competence by Prahalad and Hamel lacks a perspective how it should be nurtured and utilized in 
dynamic market environment. 
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Section 3. DYNAMIC CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR A SERIES OF TEMPORARY  
             COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
     Considering what has been discussed in the previous researches in the era of VUCA and 
hypercompetition, it is evident there should be a theory besides Porter’ SCP model and Barney’s 
RBV which premises the business environment change and adapt to it, while looks for competitive 
advantage. Again, both SCP and RBV were developed in 1980 and 1991 respectively, when was 
before or in the tipping point of the end of Cold War, following globalization, capitalization and 
digitization into VUCA and hypercompetition. 
In this context, Dynamic Capability Framework (DCF) (Teece, 1997) casts light on how a 
company obtains competitive advantage in an industry with constantly changing, and DCF is 
critically distinct from the traditional theories in that it premises dynamic environment (Figure 6). 
Teece defines DCF as a company’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure capabilities not only 
from internal but also from external to apply to the business environment changes. Thus, DCF 
reflects an organizational ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive advantage. 
DCF can clearly be distinct from capability in that DCF is the ability to implement strategy 
according to the stream of business environment change or even attempts to lead the market through 
innovative actions, while capability just indicates something to implement a particular task.  
 
Figure 6: Categorization of Theories for Competitive Advantage 
 
                                                     Source: Author 
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Teece (2009) provided three key components and requirements for consisting DCF. 
 
1. Sensing: Abilities of individual or organization is required not to access to information but 
to understand customer behaviors and new creative activities in the industry and to have 
the practical knowledge in the market. The reason why these abilities are necessary is 
because sensing an opportunity counts on an interpretation of information such as 
breakthrough of technology, conversations in a trade show, or concerns and unsatisfaction 
of customers. A company is then required to develop hypotheses for sensing new 
opportunities by interpreting and filtering information which has been accumulated 
through the interaction with the market they play. Teece suggests that it should be more 
ideal approach to embed the process of scanning and interpreting some valuable 
information from external resources not into individual but into organization, in case a 
company can weaken its capability if depending on only a few individual skills.  
2. Seizing: Once the new opportunity is identified, a company is required to work on tasks to 
invest for R&D and commercialization. Its decision making may be, however, sometimes 
impaired due to a company’s culture and its organizational structure. An organization 
which has multiple layers for decision making is inclined to be bureaucratic, resulting in 
preventing from the new opportunity or innovation. On the contrary, as is often the case 
with such structure, the management committee would head for balancing and 
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compromising, and some of the members even interfere since their organizational position 
can be threatened by the new opportunity. A company which have a successful experience 
in an existing business unit also tends to have a culture of regarding the new opportunity 
as risky, and sticking to established procedures, capabilities or management routine. 
Therefore, recognizing a company’s culture and leadership are critical to avoid those 
negative bias and appropriately seize the opportunity toward investment in R&D and 
commercialization. Selecting a business model is another ingredient for seizing, such as 
identifying a target segment, technology to adopt to the new product or service, a way to 
meet customer needs and so forth.  
3. Reconfiguring: The final component refers to reorganizing a company’s specific tangible 
and intangible assets to take the opportunity into action. Teece remarks that 
decentralization is effective to conduct reorganization since it can retain flexibility and 
responsiveness, and enhance quickness and accountability of decision making. Open 
innovation is also vital to go beyond an organization and access to an external technology 
for integration. Other two required abilities are co-specialization and knowledge 
management. Co-specialization is introduced by Teece designating the relationship 
between assets, which can give a synergetic effect with each other when combined. 
Knowledge management in this context is defined not only as an ability for learning itself 
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but as integration of knowhow within a company or between a company and an external 
organization such as a university or another company. Integrating knowhow of both 
internal and external have significant impact on success if the system and network for it 
exist, and those are critical in DCF.  
 
     Teece stresses that the past defines not only the current performance, but also performance in 
the future. Hence, managers should strive to try a lot of activities to discharge a dilemma of process 
and structure which have been built in the past. DCF then can provide managers with guideline to 
evade zero profit or even acquire a series of competitive advantage. DCF is an orchestration process 
of sensing, seizing and reconfiguring, and Teece suggests that a company should develop the 
capabilities to drive sensing, seizing and reconfiguring process to obtain and retain competitive 
advantage.  
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CHAPTER 4. JOHNSON & JOHNSON: THE COMPANY WHICH 
          CONTINUES GROWING 
Section 1. COMPANY PROFILE 
     Although it is in the time of shorter period of competitive advantage for companies, some 
companies do exist with continuous growth. Johnson & Johnson (J&J), the largest health care 
company, is one of them. J&J is a holding company, which has more than 230 operating companies 
conducting business all over the world. The company’s primary focus is products related to human 
health and well-being. J&J was founded in 1886 in New Brunswick, New Jersey (the Headquarters 
is still located at the same place) by Robert Wood Johnson and his two brothers with 14 employees. 
The executive committee of J&J is the principal management group responsible for the strategic 
operations and allocation of the resources of the company. Within the strategic parameters provided 
by the committee, international operating companies are each responsible for their own strategic 
plans and the day-to-day operations of those companies. Each operating company is managed as 
decentralized by residents of the country where located.  
     J&J’s business portfolio is divided into three segments: Medical Devices, Consumer, and 
Pharmaceutical (Figure 7). 
 
Medical Devices: 
The Medical Devices segment includes a broad range of products used in the orthopaedic, surgery, 
cardiovascular, diabetes care and vision care fields. These products are distributed to wholesalers, 
hospitals and retailers and used principally in the professional fields such as physicians, nurses and 
eye care professionals. They include orthopaedic products: general surgery, biosurgical, 
endomechanical and energy products; electrophysiology products to treat cardiovascular diseases; 
sterilization and disinfection products to reduce surgical infection; diabetes care products, such as 
blood glucose monitoring and insulin delivery products; and disposable contact lenses. 
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Consumer: 
The Consumer segment includes a broad range of products used in the baby care, oral care, beauty, 
over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceutical, women’s health and wound care markets. Baby care 
includes the JOHNSON’S
® 
line of products. Oral care includes the LISTERINE
®
 product line. 
Major brands in Beauty include such as NEUTROGENA
® 
and ROC
® 
product lines. OTC is well 
known for TYLENOL
® 
brand. Wound care brands include the BAND-AID
® 
product lines. These 
products are marketed to the general consumers and sold both to retail outlets and distributors 
throughout the world.  
 
Pharmaceutical: 
The pharmaceutical segment identifies five therapeutic areas: immunology, infectious diseases and 
vaccines, oncology, neuroscience, and cardiovascular and metabolic diseases. Products in the 
segment are distributed directly to retailers, wholesalers, hospitals and pharmacies for prescription 
use.  
 
Figure 7: Sales Share by Business Segment 
 
                         Source: J&J Annual report 2016 
 
     The business of J&J is conducted by more than 230 operating companies located in 60 
countries. The products made and sold in the international business are based on the three segments 
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(Medical Devices, Consumer, and Pharmaceutical). The principal markets, products and methods of 
distribution in the international business may vary with the country and culture, according to 
decentralization by local management. Sales split by geography shows that US accounts for 52.6% 
of sales, while the rest goes to other areas such as EU, Asia Pacific, Latin America and so on. 
Section 2. HISTORY 
4.2.1. Phase1: Foundation 
     Robert Wood Johnson, the founder of J&J with his two brothers, was 16 years old when he 
moved from Pennsylvania to Poughkeepsie, New York in 1861. The time was in Civil War, and his 
mother secured him an apprenticeship at her family’s pharmacy there since he was too young to 
serve as a soldier. There he learned the business of mixing medicated plasters, which made him have 
interest in healthcare business. After several years of apprenticeship, Johnson worked as a salesman 
of drug products, and in 1873 he co-founded his own company with George Seabury for plaster. In 
1876, Johnson visited the World’s Fair of International Medical Congress, where he listened to Dr. 
Joseph Lister explain his radical, new procedure “antiseptic surgery”. While many doctors were 
skeptical, Johnson was convinced that it was the future of medicine. His aspiration came from the 
fact that the Civil War deprived 720,000 Americans lives, the vast majority due to infection and 
disease. To limit the spread of infection, doctors performed limb amputations, and it significantly 
deteriorated quality of life of soldiers. These operations were performed by surgeons who did not 
wash their hands or clean their tools between patients, thus infection was common and often fatal 
even though the injury itself was not necessarily fatal. Based on this serious situation, Johnson 
aspired for helping those lives with sterile products. Inspired by Lister’s antiseptic methods, Johsnon 
parted ways with his business partner, Seabury, and started Johnson & Johnson in 1886 with his two 
younger brothers, Edward and James. Their company manufactured the world’s first mass-produced 
sterile surgical supplies. The company was developed in New Brunswick, New Jersey with 14 
employees: 8 women and 6 men. Today, the world headquarters remains in the same place. J&J 
produced sterile sutures, absorbent cotton, gauze and ready-made surgical dressings which 
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contributed to decreasing infections rates and saving lives. The Johnson brothers soon discovered 
that manufacturing sterile supplies was not enough—they needed to teach doctors how to use them. 
In 1888, the company published Modern Methods of Antiseptic Wound Treatment, a how-to guide 
on antiseptic surgery. Itinerant salesmen traveled far and wide to distribute Modern Methods across 
the U.S. Within a matter of months, they had given out 85,000 copies to doctors and pharmacists. 
Modern Methods was hailed as a major contribution to the field. It also served as a sales guide for 
J&J products, which were listed among the back pages. The guide helped spread germ theory and 
antiseptic surgical methods. Just 13 years earlier, in 1875, surgeons had operated in street clothes and 
worked with unclean hands. By 1889, most surgeons had adopted Lister’s methods. They operated in 
sterile robes. Here, a modern surgical team wears white uniforms and uses sterilized tools. J&J 
helped to make sterile surgery a reality. Since its founding in 1886, the company has revolutionized 
the field of medicine, manufacturing the world’s first mass-produced antiseptic medical supplies. 
4.2.2. Phase2: Entry to Consumer Business 
     J&J took advantage of its sterilization technology and knowhow for consumers products. the 
company launched various pioneering products, such as first ever first aid kits, first mass produced 
women’s sanitary protection products, and silk dental floss in 1890s. The famous JOHNSON’S
®
 
Baby Powder was launched in 1893, with J&J’s intention to save lives for mother and babies. At the 
time, the majority of American women gave birth at home, often without the help of a trained 
midwife or with medical professionals untrained in sterile procedures. In an unsterile environment, 
infections were common and claimed the lives of one in ten infants and many mothers. To combat 
these statistics, J&J released its first Maternity Kit in 1894. The kit included sterile medical supplies 
to help with birth and the first days of life, as well as a science-based educational pamphlet for 
expectant mothers and their delivery aides. BAND-AID
®
 brand adhesive bandages was launched in 
1921, which was invented by one employee to consider taking care of his wife with cut during 
cooking, with gauze put in the middle of medical tape. Through these products’ introduction, J&J 
broadened its business into the consumer market, and its distribution was expanded into pharmacies. 
Behind those consumer products, J&J’s core technology and knowledge for sterilization and 
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medication was embedded. 
4.2.3. Phase3: Globalization 
     During World War I, the U.S. Military relied on Johnson & Johnson’s line of sterile products. 
These were used to treat wounded soldiers and prevent infection from muddy trench warfare, 
keeping soldiers healthy enough to help fight off infectious diseases. It was the beginning of J&J’s 
products to go overseas. The first global expansion began from Canada in 1919, but the expansion 
did not go rapidly thereafter. In the era of after World War I, there was an atmosphere in US public 
opinion that strongly supported isolationism. It came from the devastating damage due to World War 
I, and citizens in US thought that they were forced to be involved in the war unreasonably and got 
tragic harm. As such, even managers in J&J only supported an idea of limited expansion into 
domestic agencies and wholesalers. Robert Wood Johnson Jr, the son of the founder and later the 
president from 1932-1963, only believed that J&J should build international business, and he tried 
persuading the management board many times resulting finally in approval and visiting twelve 
countries to meet stakeholders in health care in each country. In 1924, Robert built the first factory at 
the suburb area of London, UK and initiated producing products outside US. Further global business 
expansion was made in South Africa and Mexico in 1930, Argentina and Brazil in 1937, European 
and African countries during 1930-1940s, Philippines in 1956, India in 1957, Japan in 1978, China 
and Egypt in 1985, Russia in 1992 and so forth.  
4.2.4. Phase4: Broaden Portfolio into Pharmaceutical Business 
     J&J expanded its business portfolio into pharmaceutical medicines. In 1959, J&J acquired 
McNeil Laboratories (known as Tylenol) in US and Cilag Chemie in Swiss. Moreover, the company 
acquired Janssen Pharmaceutica in Belgium in 1961 to strengthen its business in pharmaceutical 
portfolio. The company continued to grow its pharmaceutical business portfolio by organic new 
product launches as well as strategic acquisitions. While broadening into pharmaceutical business, 
the company fortified the existing medical devices and consumer business portfolio through M&As. 
It includes RoC S.A. in 1993, Neutrogena in 1994, and consumer business segment of Pfizer in 2006 
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for consumer portfolio, and Cordis in 1996, DePuy in 1998 and Synthes in 2012 for strengthening or 
expanding business within medical devices portfolio.  
Section 3. CONTINUOUS GROWTH 
     As seen in the history in SECTION2, J&J has been expanding its business in terms of 
globalization and business segment, but focusing consistently on the healthcare business from 
foundation in 1886 (Figure 8). What is remarkable in J&J is not just the history over 130 years, but 
the performance. Figure 9 shows J&J’s sales trajectory from 1979 to 2016, which has been 
continuously growing. In addition, the stock price has also been following similar trend with sales, 
and its growth is far above other health care industry, DOW and S&P500 (Figure 10). Given its 
outstanding performance all the way, it must be worth analyzing how J&J has been implementing 
dynamic capability to achieve a series of temporary competitive advantage.  
 
Figure 8: Business Expansion of J&J 
 
                                                             Source: Author 
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Figure 9: J&J Sales Trajectory (Mil USD) 
 
                                                         Source: SPEEDA 
 
Figure 10: Stock Price Growth Trajectory (J&J vs Health care, Dow, S&P500) 
 
                                                      Source: REUTERS 
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S  
          CONTINUOUS GROWTH 
Section 1. METHOD 
5.1.1. Era Analysis 
     In order to analyze key drivers of J&J’s continuous growth, era analysis was conducted as 
follows; first, ten pharmaceutical companies including J&J were identified by three criteria that total 
sales value is ranked within top ten in 2016, the yearly sales trajectory can be confirmed from 2000, 
and the sales from pharmaceutical business segment accounts for the largest part of total company 
sales. Screening base on the three criteria, the following ten companies were identified: J&J, Pfizer, 
Roche, Novartis, Sanofi, Merck, GSK, AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, and Bristol Mayers Squibb. Second, 
annual sales growth % compared with 2000 was confirmed through 2016, which uncovered the year 
of apparent trend change. Third, according to the year that was identified as the point of change, key 
events were confirmed that have contributed mainly to the change. Investigating with those four 
steps make it possible what J&J is different from other companies with regards to the way of 
growing. 
5.1.2. Dynamic Capability Framework Analysis 
     Through what was identified with era analysis for J&J’s key drivers for continuous growth and 
the difference with other companies, Dynamic Capability Framework analysis was conducted so as 
to clarify how J&J is achieving continuous growth and keeping a series of competitive advantage 
from DCF point of view. The analysis was divided into each component of DCF as sensing, seizing 
and reconfiguring, and each of the three has key execution factors. Then J&J’s key activities were 
analyzed applying to those items. Further, J&J’s core competence was extracted through DCF 
analysis which enables J&J to achieve dynamic capability. For clarification of terminology, core 
competence in this thesis is defined as literally the core element of a company’s ability to drive 
dynamic capability. Thus, it premises that a company’s dynamic capability cannot be accomplished 
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without core competence at the very core of a company’s ability in this context (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Definition of Resource, Capability, Dynamic Capability and Core Competence 
 
                                 Source: Modified from Ikegami (2016) 
 
5.1.3. Activity System Analysis 
     Based on core competence of J&J extracted from DCF analysis, it was crystalized by Activity 
System, the concept originally articulated by Porter (1996). Porter uses it to capture the strategy of a 
business unit, identifying elements of the strategy which differentiates from rivals and achieve 
competitive advantage and connecting them with lines which represents relationship on how they 
reinforce with each other. Lafley and Martin (2013) adapt Porter’s Activity System in a way that 
capabilities substitute for strategic themes and the relationship among capabilities are expressed in 
connected lines to show how they reinforce respectively. For analysis of J&J’s core competence, the 
thesis adopts the latter definition and scrutinizes how each core competence of J&J relates together 
and enables dynamic capability.  
 
5.1.4. Relationship Analysis of Strategy and Core Competence Development 
     Once the relationship of core competence in J&J was captured in Activity System, the analysis 
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moved to the final step to look into the relationship of strategy and core competence development, 
making sure how strategy built and reinforced core competence and vice versa. It would be 
meaningful to attempt to uncover its relationship because the result may have implications for a 
company on how it should start thinking about strategy and core competence to conduct dynamic 
capability, which in the end leads to a series of temporary competitive advantage. Therefore, the last 
analysis refers to revisiting J&J’s strategic history and investigate how its core competence was 
created and nurtured to the extent that drives J&J’s dynamic capability. 
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CHAPTER 6. RESULTS 
Section 1. KEY DRIVERS OF JOHNSON & JOHNSON’S CONTINUOUS GROWTH 
     First, based on ten identified pharmaceutical companies, yearly sales trend was confirmed 
from 2000 to 2016 period (Figure 12). The graph shows that J&J has been steadily increasing sales 
value and leading the industry with approximately 70 billion USD, followed by Pfizer, Roche and 
Novartis with around 50 billion, and Sanofi, Merck, and GSK with 30-40 billion, and AstraZeneca, 
Eli Lilly, and Bristol Mayers Squibb with 20 billion class. Second, yearly sales growth trend was 
analyzed in 2000 vs following years until 2016 (Figure 13). Sales growth of Sanofi was excluded 
from the graph as the sales has grown significantly in a short period to be over 600% vs 2000 and 
disturbs the visual for analysis. 
 
Figure 12: Companies’ Sales Value Trajectory from 2000 to 2016 
 
                   Source: SPEEDA (Local currency was converted into USD) 
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Figure 13: Companies’ Yearly Sales Growth % from 2000 vs Following Years 
 
            Source: SPEEDA(Conversion was NOT applied for local currency) 
 
It is interesting that some companies have the growth trend in a certain pattern, and others 
have otherwise. Then, era analysis was conducted based on the growth trend of each company to see 
what made it draw such a line (key events for growth of each company are listed in APPENDIX 1). 
It was found out that the patterns can be categorized into the following three. 
1. Launching new blockbusters seamlessly: This pattern is characterized by continuous new 
product launches which grow to be blockbusters (more than 1 billion USD sales). It can also 
be seen that the growth trend goes up gradually, and the impact of down growth is relatively 
small to the contrary. The reason for this tendency lies in the characteristics that steady 
launches of new products minimizes the downside risk of patent expiration. Hence, the 
product portfolio consisting of total sales have diversity. The pattern is most applicable to 
J&J and Novartis (for Novartis, sharp growth drop in 2015 attributed to sales decrease of 
Alcon, which sells contact lenses, and Sandoz, which covers for generic drugs). For 
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example, J&J’s top 5 selling products consist of 23.6% of its total sales, and Novartis’s ones 
cover 24%. It is true that both J&J and Novartis faced sales down due to patent expiry in a 
few years, but its impact was limited within -5%. 
2. Depending on a few “super” blockbusters: The growth of this pattern comes mainly from 
big blockbusters among them. Eli Lilly, Roche, GSK, AstraZeneca, and BMS apply the 
most to the pattern. These companies tend to have the product portfolio that a few super 
blockbusters account for substantial percentage of total product sales. In addition, growth 
tends to continue as long as those block busters are secured by patent right, but steep sales 
drop is seen once they encounter patent expiry. For example, Eli Lilly has grown its sales by 
+8.6% CAGR from 2003 to 2011 with major products such as Zyprexa and Cymbalta, but it 
faced rapid sales decrease as -7% in 2012 due to Zyprexa patent expiry (Zyprexa sales in 
2011 reached 4,622 million USD covering 19% of total sales, and the sales in 2012 dropped 
to 1,701 (-63%) in just one year). Likewise, Cymbalta lost its exclusivity and decreased 
-15% of total sales in 2014 (Cymbalta sales in 2013 reached 5,084 million USD covering 
22% of total sales, and the sales dropped to 1,615 (-68%) one year later). GSK achieved 
growth during 2005-2009 with a new blockbuster Advair. In 2009, there was also an 
increasing demand for vaccine product for influenza pandemic, which contributed to 
augmenting the company total sales +16%. 2014 was a tough year for GSK with decreasing 
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total sales by -13% due to the patent expiry of Advair. AstraZeneca has increased sales 
during 2003-2009 by +9.1% CAGR thanks to Crestor, Seroquel, Nexium and Symbicort. 
Those four drugs accounted for 60% of total company sales in 2011. In 2012 and 2013, the 
sales went down significantly due to those patent expiries, impacting -23% of total sales in 
2013 vs 2011. BMS had two blockbusters, Plavix and Abilify, and the sales of the two in 
2011 reached about 10 billion USD occupying 46% of total BMS product sales. By the end 
of 2014, however, those products have faced patent expiry and the sales dropped 
significantly to 2,278 million USD, impacting -25% of total BMS sales from 2011. Only 
Roche is enjoying relatively stable growth thanks to expanding indications of existing 
oncology blockbusters without patent expiry plus seasonal demand for influenza vaccine 
Tamiflu, but the company may trace the same path with others since over 40% of its sales 
consists of just three oncology products with patent expiry in coming years. 
3. Huge M&A: This pattern shows tremendous sales growth in a very short period through 
huge M&A deals. Sanofi, Pfizer and Merck go to this type.  Sanofi-Synthélabo, the former 
company name of Sanofi-Aventis, bought Aventis in 2004 for 65 billion USD and its sales 
skyrocketed from 8,048 million EURO to 27,311 in 2005, which was +339% growth. The 
company also acquired Genzyme in 2011 for 20 billion USD, and increased sales +10% vs 
previous year (the company name was changed into Sanofi in this year). Pfizer acquired 
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Warner–Lambert in 2000 for 111.8 billion USD with +83% sales growth from 1999. The 
company also bought Pharmacia in 2003 for 60 billion, resulting in +40% sales growth. 
Further M&As continued in 2010 when the company bought Wyeth for 68 billion with 
+36% sales growth, Hospira for 15.2 billion in 2015 and Medivation and Anacor in 2016 for 
14 and 5.2 billion each. Merck acquired Schering-Plough in 2009 for 41.1 billion USD 
contributing to +67% sales growth in the next year. The company on the other hand divested 
Medco Health, a pharmacy service company, which decreased substantial sales to -57% in 
2003. While those M&As augmented sales quickly by obtaining existing key products 
which target companies had, they cannot evade sales down by patent expiry. Indeed, in 2012 
Pfizer faced 13% down growth by erosion of generic entry for Lipitor patent expiry and the 
negative impact lasted following three consecutive years. Lipitor was originally the product 
of Warner-Lambert, selling 12,886 million USD at its peak in 2006. It is also of note that the 
three companies have in common that they suffered from low growth trend for years after 
M&A, which is mainly due to the offset of sales growth for products by acquired companies 
and down growth for ones with loss of exclusivity in parent companies. 
 
     It was found out through era analysis that J&J has the characteristics for its growth by 
launching new products relentlessly. For further investigation of J&J’s uniqueness, the following two 
key questions are raised: 1) How much value do those new products have in the market? and 2) How 
can J&J achieve such continuous product launches? To answer the first question, drug sales ranking 
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in the total pharmaceutical market in 2016 was confirmed, and the data shows 122 blockbuster 
products in 2016 and J&J proves to be No.1 company with the largest number of blockbusters 
ranked, 11 products (according to Monthly Mix Jul, 2017). It is also remarkable that each 
blockbuster is not necessarily big compared with others, but as a set of 11 products, they contribute 
to J&J’s growth. Moreover, J&J has the largest number of R&D pipelines for expected blockbusters 
in 2022 among companies compared in the era analysis (Figure 15). Those data support the result of 
era analysis of J&J that the company launches new products constantly and the sum of the value of 
products rather than one super blockbuster leads to continuous growth with minimizing substantial 
sales down risk of patent expiries by the super blockbuster. 
  
Figure 15: Top 20 Most Valuable Product Pipeline in 2022 (Based on NPV) 
 
                                       Source: Evaluate Pharma 
 
     Now that the fact of J&J’s growth pattern has been confirmed, the issue goes to the second 
question on “How” J&J can make it come true. In order to answer the question, facts are presented. 
First, Figure 16 depicts investment ratio for R&D to companies’ total sales, which clearly indicates 
one interesting feature: J&J has been running with the smallest R&D investment ratio. Second, the 
origination of top 50 products by company during 2009-2014 shows that J&J has 8 out of 9 products 
35 
from acquired bio ventures (Figure 17). Indeed, J&J is conducting many M&A deals toward venture 
firms, and data shows that the company is ranked in the second among all pharmaceutical companies 
in 2015, with 62 deals which are far more than the followings (according to IMS PharmaDeals 
Review of 2015). On the other hand, another data indicates that J&J does not invest so much in 
M&A deals in terms of value, and the company is in fact ranked in 6
th
 among compared companies 
(Kameda, 2016). Taking all the facts into consideration, J&J takes advantage of a number of tiny 
M&A deals for small ventures instead of focusing on organic R&D or big M&A deals, and many 
products come out through those ventures, later growing to be blockbusters. 
 
Figure 16: Trajectory of R&D Investment Ratio to Sales 
 
                                                        Source: SPEEDA 
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Figure 17: The Number of Top 50 Sales Products by Origination (2009-2014 Total) 
 
                         Source: Modified from Kameda (2016) 
 
Section 2. CORE COMPETENCE EXTRACTED THROUGH DYNAMIC CAPABILITY  
             FRAMEWORK 
     Given that J&J achieves a series of temporary competitive advantage which leads to long term 
growth by launching blockbusters via a number of acquired small ventures, how such 
implementation is viable analyzed from DCF perspective. The result is shown in Figure 18, where 
J&J’s conduct is applied into the framework which articulates the three components as sensing, 
seizing and reconfiguring, and each of which has key execution factors.  
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Figure 18: DCF Analysis for J&J’s Continuous Competitive Advantage 
 
                                     Source: Developed by author based on DCF 
 
First, regarding Sensing, DCF presents key factors such as identify target market segments and 
changing customer needs, developments in exogenous science and technology, direct internal R&D 
and select new technologies, and supplier and complementor innovation. For those key factors for 
sensing, J&J has been playing consistently in the healthcare domain and therefore is keen to what is 
required for unmet medical needs in the industry. The company is committed to open innovation for 
exploring new and promising technologies or seeds outside the company, and founded J&J open 
innovation centers in Asia Pacific, Boston, California and London. J&J also sets a platform named 
“JLABS” at 7 locations in the world (San Diego, San Francisco, South San Francisco, Cambridge, 
Mass, Houston and Toronto), where more than 140 various venture firms reside and are being 
“incubated” by J&J. Those venture firms are supplied with J&J resources such as knowledge and the 
network all over the world. Each JLABS has the authority to select venture firms to incubate based 
on the common criteria that the new technology or knowhow they have matches one of the three J&J 
business segments. Even when a venture does not meet the criteria but has some uniqueness, JLABS 
staff keep in touch with the firm for communication. JLABS intends to explore new opportunities 
from very early phase of R&D unlike other competitors which take in-licensing strategy for some 
pipelines usually in the phase of clinical trials. It also aims to find promising “candidates” among 
venture firms for M&A investment, and even if a firm is not applicable to the candidate, JLABS 
keeps support for the firm to accomplish what it aims in the collaboration and “graduate” from 
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JLABS. Even if a venture firms cannot achieve its goal, JLABS permits the failure as it premises 
that a failure is inherent to innovation. JLABS plays an important role in knowing both tangible and 
intangible assets of venture firms (including who works in the firm), and it acts as identifying and 
communicating with promising venture firms quicker than competitors, and enhancing the 
probability of success for M&A. It is the critical uniqueness of J&J activity, and indeed there are no 
other companies but J&J which have an incubation laboratory by themselves. While J&J takes 
advantage of open innovation, its internal R&D is of course conducted. What should be important is 
that J&J strikes a well balance between external R&D exploration and internal R&D exploitation. 
The last factor of sensing capability, supplier and complementator innovation, is meant by Teece 
(2009) that companies must search the core as well as to the periphery of their business ecosystem, 
and search must embrace potential collaborators-customers, suppliers, complementors-that are active 
in innovative activity. In this context, the scope of J&J’s innovation is covered to the suburbs. For 
example, in medical devices segment J&J collaborates with IBM and Apple for the new service for 
patients. In the alliance, J&J utilizes Watson Health Cloud provided by IBM to develop 
mobile-based coaching system to support patients before or after the surgery for joint replacement 
and spines. Watson Health Cloud uses data from HealthKit developed by Apple which gathers 
personal healthcare record data from Apple watch, health check apps or fitness devices. Through this 
innovation, J&J aims to provide personalized medical services to patients. 
The second component, Seizing, is made up of four factors as delineating the customer 
solution and the business model, selecting enterprise boundaries (Value chain), selecting decision 
making protocols, and building loyalty and commitment for employees. For the first and second 
factor, J&J adopts new technologies or ideas to customer solution and business model, and 
sometimes substitutes them for existing ones. The personalized medical services explained in 
sensing part is one of examples. When it comes to the pharmaceutical business segment, J&J 
proactively adopt promising R&D seeds from acquired venture firms, and sometimes replace them 
for internal R&D projects. This activity may include dilemma or cannibalization for decision 
between the two, but J&J dares to conduct and reflect the output through open innovation on its 
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real-life business activities. The ability for the decision relates to the third factor, selecting decision 
making protocols. Teece stresses that a manager’s ability to override certain “dysfunctional” features 
of established decision rules and resource allocation processes is one of crucial parts in DCF. 
According to Teece, this comes from the inclination of the top management team that top managers 
make a decision for balance and compromise. Some board members may even attempt to prevent 
from welcoming innovation in the organization in the fear their status quo would be threatened by 
something new and radical. The existence of multiple procedures, current capabilities, and routine of 
management may also promote decision making bias. That is way selecting decision making 
protocols is important, and J&J has one universal protocol: Our Credo (the statement is put in 
APPENDIX 2). The philosophy of J&J consists of four “Responsibilities”, and the responsibility for 
customers is put in the highest priority, followed by employees, communities, and stockholders at 
last. There are also 21 “Must Dos” written in the statement, and it is clarified to develop innovative 
programs, and to experiment with new ideas. In other words, Our Credo defines criteria and priority 
for decision making. Indeed, J&J cherishes Our Credo and put it in the core of the company’s 
decision making for not only the top management level but each business segment of operational 
companies throughout the world. As for the last factor of seizing, building loyalty and commitment 
for employees, J&J makes full use of Our Credo to motivate and direct employees. The management 
team frequently communicates with employees all over the world via e-mail or video to remind how 
important Our Credo is for daily business conducts and decision making, often introducing real 
world cases J&J has recently encountered. Along with the top management, each family company 
holds a town hall meeting per year and there the case study is implemented toward employees. The 
case study depicts the situation of real life business decision making, and urges them how they must 
think and determine their conduct according to Our Credo. It includes topics such as ethical 
corporate culture and health care compliance. Moreover, J&J conducts an annual “Credo Survey” to 
all family companies in the world to make sure if employees feel strategy from the corporate to the 
business unit level is properly executed, and more importantly it is healthy and aligned with four 
responsibilities of Our Credo. The survey requires 100% participation of all the family companies, 
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and the top management team and managers in operational countries remind many times for its 
completion. The result is analyzed and shared with all employees, and they can compare the result of 
their team with other organizational level from business segment and country level. Employees 
discuss with colleagues in the absence of their managers to understand the result and how it should 
be improved, and share with managers. Managers then contemplate the action plan and carry it out. 
Through those activities, Our Credo is knitted in every single organization in J&J and family 
companies, which is the core culture of J&J. 
     The last component, Reconfiguring, is the ability that drives recombine and reconfigure assets 
and organizational structures for execution of what a company seized from sensing phase. For 
reconfiguration, four factors are identified as decentralization, governance, cospecialization, and 
knowledge management. Decentralization is as good as a synonym for J&J. The company has long 
been managing based on decentralization since the initial stage of its globalization, when Robert 
Wood Johnson insisted sustaining speedy decision making even in the swelling business size and the 
organization. J&J has more than 260 family companies in three business segments in the world, and 
while corporate and three business segments strategy is integrated in the headquarters level, family 
companies are authorized to execute their business in a way they think is the best depending on the 
business environment in a region. For example, a local company can determine whether sales and 
marketing for a newly upcoming drug should be standalone by the company, having co-promotional 
agreement with some partner company, or out-licensing according to the company’s resources, 
competitive situation or prevalence of the disease in that country. In addition, as Teece mentions the 
merit of decentralization for retaining flexibility and responsiveness of an organization, J&J leaves it 
to each family company for the organizational change better to execute based on the local 
environment. Hence, it is not necessarily the same organizational structure among countries although 
the business segment itself is the same. Apparently, it may cause inconvenience for communication 
among countries in the same business segment, but in fact it is not the case as communication is 
mainly by way of project team base. The governance of J&J is related in many parts to its 
decentralization management style. Its governance is characterized by small sized management 
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aiming to retain prompt decision making within an organization. As implied from more than 260 J&J 
family of companies, J&J subdivides the organization size and the policy applies to venture firms 
acquired, or new business developments. Venture firms can keep their entity and pursuit their project, 
and for the case of a new business development J&J conducts spin-off into one startup. It is also of 
note that remaining in small size can enable J&J headquarters to divest the entity when necessary. 
For cospecialization, J&J takes advantage of three business segments to generate a new value. For 
example, the company launched Drug Eluting Stent (DES) named Cypher in 2003 for the surgery of 
ischemic heart disease. The product was developed by Cordis, a family company of J&J, and praised 
by physicians as big innovation in that the drug is applied in the stent to elute gradually after the 
stent placement to decrease the risk of stenosis. This innovation is made by cospecialization of assets 
or knowhow in Medical Devices segment and Pharmaceutical segment (In 2015 J&J divested Cordis 
to Cardinal Health, as a result of fierce competition versus following similar products launched after 
several years later of Cypher launch). Regarding the last factor, knowledge management, employees 
in each family company of J&J have the communication network. In detail, they organize a cross 
functional project team for a task such as a new drug introduction with counterparts in the world, and 
as a team they exchange information and solve issues. They usually have regular web meetings, and 
sometimes meet face to face. The network surely gives an opportunity for integrating and exploiting 
learning among employees in different countries. J&J also has the integrated system for human 
resources (HR). In the system, J&J is committed to talent development and conduct a job posting for 
three business segments. The company provides its job posting information in the intranet, where 
any kinds of jobs in recruitment is open to all the employees all over the world. For instance, if an 
employee in pharmaceutical segment in Japan has an aspiration for working in Medical Devices 
segment in US, he or she is permitted to apply for the position as long as the job is posted in the 
intranet. For HR evaluation criteria, J&J cherishes “Leadership Imperatives” which the company 
defines four types of leadership as Connect, Shape, Lead and Deliver. The criteria are common in all 
the three business segments in all the countries. The two integrated HR systems, job posting and 
common leadership criteria, ensure that employees can move flexibly to another country or business 
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segment, and knowledge is intermingled. Indeed, J&J promotes employees to have cross sector 
experiences, and it is one of the uniqueness of J&J. For networking with external organizations, it 
goes without saying that J&J’s open innovation system and JLABS play a key role. 
     Analyzing J&J’s activities according to the three components of DCF, it was found out that 
J&J does practice sensing, seizing and reconfiguring with its unique capabilities, and orchestrates all 
the processes to achieve a series of temporary competitive advantage. While the orchestration of the 
three processes is the essence of DCF, how to implement and why it is possible is what the theory 
cannot tell because the approach may depend on capabilities which a company has. Now that how to 
implement J&J’s dynamic capability is uncovered, the question proceeds to why. Then, core 
competence of J&J which makes its dynamic capability come true was extracted from each process.  
First, in the sensing process, two core competence were identified: customer and market 
knowledge, and innovation. The former derives from the feature of J&J that the company has been 
consistently playing in the healthcare domain as medical devices, consumer and pharmaceutical. 
Although the industries the company plays are three in a narrow sense, each industry has to do with 
each other in terms of healthcare and customer and hence it is not conglomerate. J&J has 
accumulated customer and market knowledge from the foundation in 1886, and it contributes to 
J&J’s dynamic capability that it is keen to sensing customer changing needs. Innovation is another 
core competence of J&J as the company successfully takes advantage of it for sensing phase and 
reflect it on the real-life business. The company has management system for innovation through 
setting open innovation centers, incubating venture firms, and absorbing promising new technology 
or ideas into its real business. The commitment for innovation is extraordinary.  
For the second seizing process, other two core competence enable J&J to implement its 
dynamic capability. Our Credo acts as the core driver for decision making and people management 
in J&J, and it is deeply embedded in the organization. The company has system to penetrate the 
principle into all family companies and employees in the world and reflect on their daily tasks. 
Another competence is alliance management, which ensures appropriate judgement for acquisition 
of promising venture firms for future value creator.  
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Core competence of J&J for the last reconfiguring process are decentralized management and 
balanced strategy and execution. J&J conducts decentralized management in a way that each family 
company runs in small size, and each of them is connected under shared value of Our Credo. 
Balanced strategy and execution is another J&J’s core competence coming from Our Credo and 
decentralization, which validates the company’s reconfiguring activities with flexibility. 
Section 3. ACTIVITY SYSTEM COMPOSED OF CORE COMPETENCE 
     Based on the six core competence of J&J which enable the company to implement dynamic 
capability, they were crystalized into Activity System (Figure 19). Each core competence is 
connected with lines and formed into the set of J&J’s uniqueness, and every single of core 
competence is indispensable for J&J’s activities today. The interpretation of 11 lines are written as 
below. 
 
Figure 19: J&J’s Activity System 
 
                                                      Source: Author 
 
1. Our Credo clarifies in the statement that doctors, nurses and patients are customers of J&J, 
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which defines its target market as healthcare and consistent domain they play. Customer and 
market knowledge is nurtured thanks to this determined company’s aspiration. 
2. The sentence “We must experiment with new ideas” in Our Credo endows an incentive for 
innovative activities and company’s commitment to offering a new value. 
3. Accumulated customer and market knowledge senses unmet medical needs and determines 
direction for innovative exploration. The discovery of new technology or seeds explored 
through innovation exploits and deepens customer and market knowledge to the contrary. 
4. Incubation-based open innovation gives an opportunity to get in touch with many venture 
firms with tangible and intangible assets, which broadens the variety of choices for promising 
venture firms to acquire as well as enabling quick decision making. 
5. Accumulated customer and market knowledge enhances the ability of connoisseur in selecting 
candidate venture firms and their assets for acquisition which may generate future value. 
6. The system or discipline of penetrating Our Credo into all family companies of three business 
segments in the world harnesses management with decentralization under the shred value of 
the principle. 
7. Striking a balance between strategy and execution is secured by annual Credo Survey, which 
works as vigilance if the organization is healthy in terms of strategy and execution based on 
four responsibilities of Our Credo. 
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8. Decentralization permits the balance of strategy and execution. While strategy of corporate 
and business segment level is integrated into the top management team in J&J worldwide 
headquarters, execution is localized by region so that it can be carried out in a desirable way. 
9. The new technology or seeds that venture firms have is obtained by acquisition, which is 
aligned with the integrated strategy in corporate or business segment level. The acquired 
assets are introduced to local execution for clinical trials according to local regulations. 
10. Venture firms after acquired remain their entity and continue their research under the 
decentralized management. 
11. Decentralized management leads to accumulation of customer and market knowledge in each 
region and business segment. The knowledge can be referred to understanding and sensing 
unmet medical needs for further exploration activities. 
 
Section 4. HOW CORE COMPETENCE IS DEVELOPED 
     Last but not least, the analysis proceeds to uncover how the core competence of J&J was 
developed. The result was obtained through revisiting the history of J&J and analyzing the 
relationship between strategy taken and core competence developed (Figure 20). It clearly shows 
that strategy has created core competence and carved its characteristics, and core competence in turn 
helped to develop new strategy. For example, when J&J initiated its business, the company 
proactively adopted the new technology from external into the innovative product, “sterile plaster”. 
In other words, the company did not have knowhow to launch the product with its own resources, 
but its aspiration for saving people’s lives drove leveraging external environment. The strategic 
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intent then nurtured J&J’s innovation competence, which later broadened its business to consumer 
segment and introduced many “first in market” innovative products such as emergency kit, silk 
dental floss, baby powder and adhesive bandages. The competence of innovation also enables J&J to 
implement current open innovation strategy.  
 
Figure 20: Relationship of Strategy and Core Competence Development 
 
                                                              Source: Author 
 
Our Credo was developed during the strategic phase of globalization, when J&J expanded into 
regions outside US. Along with its expansion, J&J had to conduct management of subsidiaries in the 
world with localized employees, and it increased the need to make the company’s philosophy in 
documentation. It was also the time when J&J became a publicly held company and opened its stock 
to New York Stock Exchange in 1944. Under such situations, the president Robert Wood Johnson Jr. 
created Our Credo so that J&J can have the universal shared value in all companies in the world, as 
well as declaring to the stockholders and the market that J&J would not change the company’s 
management philosophy. At that time (even now) putting customers the very first ahead of 
stockholders was uncommon, and in fact some J&J board members even objected to Our Credo as 
the responsibility for stockholders was put in the last. Robert Wood Johnson Jr., however, disagreed 
vehemently saying “If we put the customer first and follow through on our other responsibilities, I 
assure you that the stockholders will be well served. And, don’t forget, I am the largest stockholder”. 
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He actually wrote a book in 1935 for business leaders in US to express his idea for management: 
 
Out of the suffering of the past few years has been born a public knowledge and conviction that 
industry only has the right to succeed where it performs a real economic service and is true social 
asset. Such permanent success is possible only through the application of an industry philosophy 
of enlightened self interest. It is to the enlightened self interest of modern industry to realize that 
its service to its customers comes first, its service to its employees and management second, and 
its stockholders last. It is to the enlightened self interest of industry to accept and fulfill its share 
of social responsibility. 
 
Although the time was in the great recession and business leaders did not follow the idea, Robert 
Wood Johnson Jr. strongly believed the concept of customer first before developing Our Credo, and 
he even told other board members and employees of J&J when Our Credo was introduced that those 
who do not endorse it could look for employment elsewhere. Based on his aspiration for who J&J is, 
the philosophy of Our Credo was spread in the organization and retained all the way to the current 
management through the system such as Credo survey and Credo town hall meeting. Core 
competence of Our Credo that its shared value is penetrated and maintained as a system in all 
employees helped the strategy to broaden the business portfolio into three with small sized 
management and with balanced strategy and execution. The strategy to take advantage of open 
innovation is validated by the philosophy of innovation from the foundation, decentralized 
management, balanced strategy and execution, and customer and market knowledge. And the 
strategy supported by those core competence generates the ability of alliance management. Customer 
and market knowledge has ever been nurtured throughout J&J’s business trajectory from the 
foundation as the company has devoted itself to the healthcare business domain (in precise, J&J once 
created a company through the internal R&D in 1961 named Devro which produced sausage casing 
in mind that collagen inside casing would be beneficial to its healthcare purpose. Collagen as its 
ingredient derived from the technology from a suture from Medical Devices segment, but Devro was 
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divested in 1991 after the decision to quit the suture product). It is obvious that the nurtured 
competence of customer and market knowledge ensured J&J’s strategy to broaden business segments 
within the healthcare domain, and open innovation for sensing promising venture firms. The strategy 
in turn deepened the competence. 
As seen in a series of relationship between strategy and core competence through J&J’s history 
from 1886 to the present, strategy creates core competence, and core competence then enables 
strategy for the next step. Once the core competence was generated, J&J nurtured and enforced it 
throughout its activities such as customer and market knowledge, and the set of core competence 
gifts J&J to exert its dynamic capability. 
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION 
Section 1. HOW SHOULD A COMPANY ACHIEVE CONTINUOUS GROWTH? 
     DCF analysis discovered how J&J achieves a series of temporary competitive advantage and 
continuous growth. The company does practice and orchestrate each sensing, seizing and 
reconfiguring process of DCF. It would be valuable that the effectiveness of DCF was confirmed by 
the in-depth analysis of J&J’s real-life case for continuous growth. 
J&J’s DCF is based on the activity which coheres to healthcare domain all the way but 
continues to be competitive and lead the market. Playing in the consistent domain may include the 
risk that a company’s resources would be fixed to the level they cannot be flexibly reformed when it 
is necessary to deal with environment change. Henderson (2006) points out that the problem of 
“competence trap” attributes to the organizational proclivity. In that sense J&J’s DCF should be 
remarkable since the company evade falling into such a trap by exploring external opportunities 
which would lead the future market and assimilating within its organization. The company on the 
contrary take advantage its customer and market knowledge accumulated thanks to playing long 
time in the same business domain to identify the new opportunities and promising venture firms for 
acquisition in the open innovation activity. 
While J&J plays in the same field, others may achieve dynamic capability by restructuring the 
business domain. A good example is General Electric (GE), the company well known for changing 
business domains or portfolio aggressively with the method of Product Portfolio Management (PPM). 
Both the two are named as the great company by Collins (1994) for outstanding long term growth, 
but their approach for dynamic capability goes to the opposite. The result thereafter projects a 
different view; J&J continues growing, and GE stagnates. It suggests that implementing DCF itself is 
not sufficient, but “How” to implement is more of essence in the current business environment. Now, 
Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) investment and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
is in fashion all the more VUCA and hypercompetition go, and this situation clearly asks for “raison 
d’etre” of a company. Lessons learned from “Lehman Shock” and empowered consumers harnessed 
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by digitization may contribute to the increase of its awareness. In addition, under VUCA and 
hypercompetition, a company may encounter unexpected competitors at any moment. Then a 
company should recognize even subtle changes of customer and market needs, and proactively 
explore the new opportunity from external as well as internal to prevent from being overwhelmed by 
the disruptive competition and more to lead the market with offering new value to customers and the 
market. Conducting such activities should require a company to deeply understand its customers and 
market. Based on those backgrounds, it is getting more critical than ever to understand customers 
and a market they play, which indicates more importance of sensing process of DCF to identify 
target market and changing customer needs. Martin (2010) insists that it be the age of “Customer 
Capitalism” taking over shareholder value capitalism showing that companies with customer 
capitalism which prioritizes customers’ satisfaction first (He introduces J&J as representative) 
actually do better in terms of shareholder value than ones with shareholder value capitalism which 
prioritizes to maximize shareholders’ value first. Martin (2016) also remarks below:  
 
Pursuit of shareholder value maximization does a crummy job of maximizing shareholder value. 
The reason is that it cannot be pursued directly. Shareholder value only grows when other things – 
like making customers happy, creating an environment for employees, being a great corporate 
citizen – happen. 
 
What Martin states definitely duplicates what is stated in J&J’s Our Credo. J&J brought the customer 
capitalism over 70 years ago when companies and societies suffered from the world great depression, 
and it is the reincarnation and quite suggestive that the idea is becoming paid attention from the great 
recession by Lehman Shock. 
Section 2. WHY CAN THE COMPANY IMPLEMENT DYNAMIC CAPABILITY? 
     It was found out through the analysis of J&J’s activity system that the set of core competence 
as the activity system has enabled J&J to implement its DCF. In addition, the analysis clarified that 
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each core competence of activity system has been developed and fortified through a series of 
strategy, and the core competence in turn has enabled the company to develop next strategy. Behind 
its relationship, Our Credo as the company’s core value and the very core of core competence has 
been directing the course of strategy and core competence development. In detail, Our Credo puts 
customers first in its business priority, and the renewal of strategy and core competence is triggered 
by this customer orientation.  
The discovery poses an implication that a company should develop the mechanism to renew 
strategy and core competence based on its core value with customer orientation, which enables the 
company to implement DCF. Collins (1994) states the requirement to become a company with 
sustainable growth rests on the penetration of the company’s core value in the organization. He 
explains that GE has the core value to create a leader inside the organization who can manage the 
company to change its business domain or portfolio with restructuring the organization. However, it 
seems that GE’s core value does not lead its DCF in a way the company can retain continuous 
growth. The situation that J&J’s core value successfully directs the development of strategy and core 
competence for continuous growth while GE does not although both the two have the embedded 
core value would support the implication. 
     As articulated, J&J’s commitment to Our Credo is extraordinary. It is so much pierced into the 
organization because the company earnestly intends to do so. The company continues to invest in 
nurturing the core value to every employee through the system noted in the previous chapter, and it 
even refers to the story of “Tylenol” tragedy in 1982, when someone from external adulterated a 
fatal poison into capsules of Tylenol at pharmacies in Chicago, leading to deaths of seven people 
who had taken the capsules, and the company recalled all the products throughout US at the cost of 
80 million USD according to the customers first philosophy of Our Credo. Schwartz (2013) explains 
ethical corporate culture consists of core ethical values, ethical leadership and ethical program, and 
J&J has been nurturing Our Credo by meeting those factors to the disciplined organizational core 
competence. It is just unlike other companies which declare CSR “plausibly”. The commitment of 
J&J is much more of the discipline that “forces” employees to behave and exert their leadership for 
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the business goal, which has been unchanged from the time when Robert Wood Johnson Jr. said in 
1943 that those who do not endorse it could look for employment elsewhere. Collins (1994) 
expresses J&J’s enthusiasm as “cult-like” culture, and points out that great companies with long term 
growth have the tendency to enlighten the philosophy to employees and those who are not willing to 
adapt would be flicked off. J&J does require sheer observance to employees, and thus they owe the 
great responsibility. It would mean in turn that the employees watch closely behaviors of the 
company whether it conducts daily business according to Our Credo. J&J acts in conformity with 
what the company is committed all the more the company coerces its commitment to employees. 
Without it, the employees would not continue to hold loyalty to the company, and the company 
cannot retain the core value to drive the mechanism to renew strategy and core competence for 
continuous growth. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
     The thesis attempts to uncover how a company should achieve continuous growth through a 
series of temporary competitive advantage in the era of VUCA and hypercompetition through 
real-life case of Johnson & Johnson. The result indicates that J&J has been achieving continuous 
growth through orchestrating DCF process of sensing, seizing and reconfiguring. Further analysis 
based on J&J’s activity system reveals that the set of core competence ensures DCF implementation, 
and J&J’s Our Credo is put at the core of core competence and acts as the adhesive to interrelate 
each core competence into J&J’s activity system. The set of core competence has been generated by 
each phase of J&J’s strategy, and the core competence in turn has enabled the company to develop 
next strategy.  
     The result of J&J’s real-life case analysis implies how a company should achieve continuous 
growth, and implementing DCF, especially identifying changing customer and market needs in its 
sensing process should be effective in rapidly changing business environment. The result poses a 
further implication on why the company can implement DCF, and developing the mechanism to 
renew strategy and core competence based on the company’s core value with customer orientation 
should be of essence. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1: The Result of Era Analysis for Compared Companies 
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(Novartis) 
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(Merck) 
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(BMS) 
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APPENDIX 2: J&J’s Our Credo 
 
